Naturally, there are various definitions of corruption, all of which concur that it involves a breach of law and order, either through the misuse of their absence or a lack of commitment to them, with the purpose of gaining personal or group interests in the political, economic, or social spheres. It is also reasonable to view corruption as behavior that violates the official duties of a public office to achieve personal (material or moral) gains. Therefore, in this report, we define corruption as an illegal act as outlined by Transparency International: "Any act that involves the abuse of a public office for the purpose of gaining personal interest for the abuser or their group." Corruption can cause damage (material or moral) to the public interest and is an immoral and non-patriotic act.
The broader concept of managerial and financial corruption includes all illegal acts that violate state laws and regulations, encompassing actions that aim to achieve personal gains at the expense of public interest. Examples include the misuse of public property, acceptance of bribes, gifts, or grants, favoritism or nepotism, disregard for competence and equal opportunity in hiring, as well as embezzlement in the form of commissions, dealings, contracts, and substantial financial agreements.
First, it is important to acknowledge the extreme difficulty we faced in observing events to uncover the facts and positions hidden behind them, not to mention obtaining documented statistics from Libyan official sources. Driven by the belief that the right to know and access to information are fundamental rights enshrined in international treaties and charters, we designed a questionnaire on corruption in Libya, intending to publish our results on our website and through various electronic channels. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19 of both documents) underline these rights. Given the interrelation between freedom of opinion and access to information, our questionnaire emerged as the best available alternative. It should be noted that while the electronic questionnaire does not equate to a rigorously scientific survey, we found it sufficient to complete our report with a degree of objectivity, based on documented statistics, numbers, and analyses.
Libyan authorities have consistently enforced absolute control over information, particularly in various media forms. For the past three decades, the media landscape has been characterized by a complete lack of independence, competence, and transparency, devoid of what can be called a 'free press.' Although a number of websites have emerged within Libya to cautiously reveal aspects of corruption, despite having the professional capabilities to address these issues with courage and investigative vigor, these platforms often seem to serve private agendas. Additionally, the lack of legal safeguards renders the opening of certain files a daunting prospect. Given these circumstances, the initiative to design and disseminate this questionnaire appears both rational and practical. We crafted the questionnaire to align with the goals and nature of the data required, while also considering the convenience of data entry and electronic processing.
The questionnaire was disseminated via email and subsequently published on the main pages of www.transparency-libya.com, www.libyaforum.org, www.akhbar-libya.com, www.justice4libya.com, and other Libyan websites, which shared the link for various periods.
The initial sample, consisting of 500 respondents, included basic demographic information such as sex, age, social status, number of family members, residency region, educational level, and profession/trade.
The demographic results were as follows:
As anticipated, male participation was at 90.02 percent, while female participation was at 9.98 percent, below our target ratio.
The age group of 36-43 had the highest number of respondents (37.40 percent), followed closely by the 26-35 age group (35.6 percent). The 46-55 age group accounted for 16.06 percent, the 16-25 group for 7.32 percent, and those over 55 made up only 0.7 percent.
Most respondents were married (62.20 percent), followed by singles (33.13 percent), divorcees (3.25 percent), and widows (1.42 percent).
The majority of respondents (43.94 percent) belonged to medium-sized families (3-5 members), followed by larger families (more than 5 members at 36.15 percent) and smaller families (less than 3 members at 19.91 percent).
In terms of residency, most respondents were from the western region (50.52 percent), followed by the eastern region (32.51 percent), central region (11.18 percent), southern region (4.35 percent), and oases region (4.35 percent).
Respondents' educational levels revealed a correlation between participation in the questionnaire and access to computers and the internet, with the highest proportion of participants holding university degrees or higher (44.44 percent), followed by individuals in higher education (38.27 percent), those with high school diplomas (13.99 percent), and those with less than high school education (3.92 percent).
The categories of profession/specialty/craft reflected the structure of Libyan society, with public sector employees leading at 43.12 percent, followed by private sector employees (23.48 percent), retirees and unemployed individuals (16.19 percent), foreign company employees (12.73 percent), students and trainees (3.64 percent), and employees from people's organizations at the lowest representation (0.81 percent).
The preliminary analysis of the results, encompassing 500 respondents, represented a 'random' sample of Libyan citizens with internet access. However, the results aligned well with the demographic structure of Libyan society, except for the lower representation of women compared to men, which we had hoped would be higher.
The questionnaire included specific questions addressing the following aspects of corruption:
1. The most prevalent fields of corruption within state and societal institutions. 2. The most corrupt elements of power. 3. The trends of corruption's increase or decrease in various institutions. 4. The selection criteria and norms for members of inspection committees, public oversight, and financial and bureaucratic accountability within state institutions. 5. The criteria and norms for selecting heads and members of committees responsible for evaluating transparency presented by state officials. 6. The role of state, government, and societal institutions in exposing and combating corruption. 7. The role of state, government, and societal institutions in supporting, protecting, or enabling corrupt figures. 8. The prevalence of corruption across state institutions, public and private sectors, firms, organizations, and international agencies operating in Libya. 9. The impact of varying forms of corruption on government effectiveness in managing state and societal affairs, including economic, trade, environmental, educational, cultural, intellectual, and social activities. 10. The seriousness and capability of ruling authorities to combat corruption and dismantle corruption mafias within the country. 11. The necessity for a broad alliance of civil society organizations to fight corruption, expose corrupt mafias, and prosecute them through all available means domestically and internationally.
Results of the Questionnaire on Corruption
The Major Fields of Financial and Bureaucratic Corruption in Libya:
The forms of corruption have remarkably increased over the year 2006, especially after the relative opening to the world abroad. Qaddafi was able to eliminate the major issues with the West. As a result, Libya signed hundreds of contracts and economic agreements with U.S., western, and eastern companies in the fields of exploring, producing, and marketing oil. Agreements have been held to reconstruct the country in all aspects of public life, which meant billions needed to remedy the chronic crises suffered by the country infrastructure. This also resulted in thousands of businessmen and companies coming to benefit from the newly-emerging investment opportunities. All this made the opportunities of corruption grow faster. This remark has been supported by the questionnaire's results.
Upon asking the respondents: To what extent the rate of corruption of all forms increased or decreased within the institution they work at or deal with in 2006, the answer were as follows:
45.03 percent responded that the rate of corruption increased to a great extent;
26.64 percent responded that they had no chance to determine;
18.18 percent responded that the rate of corruption increased to some extent;
8.46 percent responded that the rate of corruption decreased to some extent;
1.69 percent responded that the rate of corruption decreased to a great extent.
The questionnaire concluded that the areas of corruption in Libya, especially in 2006, vary and spread in convergent rates. This proves that corruption of all forms spread unchecked in the state's institutions and in society in the following order:
Direct and indirect stealing and embezzlement of public money (11.68 percent);
Nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal opportunities (11.28 percent);
Nepotism in performing personal favors for relatives and friends (10.80 percent);
The use of public resources for personal, law-breaking interest (10.77 percent);
Laying hold of certain amounts of money as commission for trade contracts or purchases (10.67 percent);
Asking for, and giving, bribes in return for certain favor (10.67 percent);
Tampering with figures in reports and information with the purpose of forgery and fraud (9.41 percent);
Illegally acquiring certain law-breaking material privileges for some reason (9.24 percent);
Money Laundry as a means to evade the law (7.09 percent);
On revising the most widespread and effective cycles of corruption in state's institutions and in society, these may be rearranged as follows:
1. Stealing Oil Revenues
Oil revenues and the state's destinies in general have long been deemed lawful to steal by the ruling elite, including members of the Leader's family, close friends, and the politically, Revolutionary, economically, and tribally influential figures. This is a fertile field of corruption that can hardly be estimated or confined. There is no way for any observer of this phenomenon to determine the amounts of money being stolen by Colonel Qaddafi, nor the properties and money at the disposal of his sons and daughters (including Hanaa, the adopted one), nor the areas of land the Colonel's wife, Safiyya Firkash, has been well-known to have seized. Some of the information that leaks here and there about this ruling dynasty's manipulation of the state's fate may represent only the tip of the iceberg whose depth and size can hardly be measured. This extends to include all close associates of tribesmen, military and security elite, People's Committees' leaderships, and local investment companies.
On surveying opinions about the most corrupt elements in power (where respondents can choose more than one option), the results came as follows:
1- The Revolutionary Committees' leaderships (18.08 percent);
2- Members of People's Committees (municipalities) and People’s Congresses (18.03 percent);
3- Members of the ruling family (16.62 percent);
4- Prominent figures within the Qaddafi Tribe (16.12 percent);
5- Businessmen favored by the authorities (15.95 percent);
6- Army and police officers (15.20 percent).
2. Pillage of Public Money
This means laying hands on the state's institutions' allocations and acting freely with them under various names. Despite all that is being claimed about standing up against the "Fat Cats", i.e., the symbols of corruption in Libya, the influential figures in Libyan government institutions (ministries of the People's Committees, secretariats of the People's Congresses, heads of government projects, army officers, etc) still carry on abusing offices and public positions to gain personal privileges (cars, telephones, tremendous amounts of illegal money, contracts, agencies, commissions, etc), especially when it comes to infrastructure projects.
Means of public money pillage vary, each according to their position, courage, connections, and the institutions they run or work at. This includes, for example, the ministers and executives who use for personal and family purposes the cars allocated to the ministries or the projects they run. Others tamper with the 'odds and ends', which are usually settled by forged bills. As a result, the original value of a bill is paid in double by the public budget, and the settlement goes to the executive or one of his aids. Tremendous amounts of money are distributed to the influential figures in form of training courses and or duties abroad. The higher the office, the more costly the benefits are. Thus, training courses and duties abroad represent a major field of pillage with almost no avail to the public authority being pillaged.
Among the major results of the Questionnaire was that the various practices of corruption have prevailed in all apparatus of the regime and institutions of the state. The distribution of opinions seems convergent among most institutions so that the differences display no major statistical significant difference. The distinction of various institutions in regards to the prevalence of corruption was displayed in the following question:
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